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Abstract:  This study examines family farms and characteristics affecting farm 
succession. Based on a farm survey, three aspects of succession are analysed in the paper: the 
probability of family succession; the likelihood of having a successor designated; and the 
timing of succession. Large and specialised farms are more likely to be transferred within the 
family and to have appointed a successor. The number of family members, as well as the 
experience of farm operator, is also significantly related to the succession behaviour. The 
probabilities of succession, and of having a successor, first increase with age and then decline 
again. Furthermore, timing of succession is delayed as the farm holder ages, suggesting most 
farm operators’ succession plans to be inconsistent over time. In addition, we find a 
significant interrelationship between the different aspects of succession indicating that 
decisions on family succession, the designation of a successor, as well as the timing of 
succession, are not separable. 
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Intergenerational Succession on Family Farms: 
Evidence from Survey Data 
Thomas Glauben, Hendrik Tietje and Christoph R. Weiss 
 
1. Introduction 
A characteristic feature of the farming sector, as opposed to most sectors of the economy, is 
that enterprises are traditionally passed on within the family.
1 Whereas the study of farm 
succession already has a long tradition in the Rural Sociology literature (Gasson and 
Errington, 1993; Blanc and Perrier-Cornet, 1993) agricultural economists have devoted 
surprisingly little attention to this topic. Furthermore most of the economics literature is 
normative, focusing on the issue of optimal planning and financing of inter-generational 
transfers (Boehlje and Eisengruber, 1972; Tauer, 1985; Reinders et al. 1980). Only a few 
studies aim at proposing reasons for the predominance of inter-generational succession in the 
farm sector.  Pesquin, et al. (1999), point out that intra-family succession enables the family 
to realise benefits from intergenerational risk-sharing when annuity markets are incomplete. 
It provides an often implicit contractual insurance arrangement since the generations overlap 
and share income. In addition, it allows parents to rely on the farm for old-age support and 
therefore to partly overcome binding borrowing constraints (Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981; 
Kimhi and Lopez, 1997). Pesquin, et al. (1999), mention additional advantages of intra-
family farm succession such as ‘smooth’ transition, reduction in transfer cost and lower 
transfer taxes. By focusing on the transfer of human capital across generations, Laband and 
Lentz (1983) as well as Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985) add that the existence of returns to 
land-specific experience creates incentives for children to work on the family farm when 
young. Human capital is acquired in childhood as a by-product of growing up. This farm-
specific human capital increases the value of the transferred physical asset; the young thus are 
the highest market bidders for their parents’ land. 
                                                 
1   Laband and Lentz (1983), for example, find that farmers are nearly nine times more likely to have 
followed in their fathers’ footsteps that the other self employed workers, and thirty times more likely to 
follow their fathers than the average worker in their sample. In fact, this inter-generational succession 
can be considered a constituent element of family farms: “the final distinguishing feature of an ideal 
type of farm family business is that business ownership and management are handed down within the 
family” (Gasson and Errington, 1993, p. 39). Similarly, Pfeffer (1989) argues: “ an essential aspect of 
family farming is the perpetuation of this form of agricultural production across generations” (p. 428).  2
In the 1990’s, some empirical work on farm succession in agricultural economics was 
undertaken. Summarising this literature is difficult, however, for two reasons.  First, 
empirical studies have been carried out in many different regions, and the arrangements, legal 
rules, and social customs in passing on holdings from one generation to the next vary 
substantially between these regions.
2  Second, the existing literature analyses different 
dimensions of succession, making a comparison of results difficult. By focusing on the 
timing of farm succession, Kimhi (1994) examines actual farm transfers on the basis of 
census data for Israel. The author finds that the transfer time varies systematically with 
family and farm characteristics. Transfer time decreases with parents’ age and with a child’s 
educational level, but increases with parents’ experience.  Furthermore, farms are transferred 
earlier in more recently established villages and when the operator is also working off the 
farm. Kimhi’s empirical results support the idea that timing of farm succession is determined 
by altruistic parents seeking to maximize family welfare in the future. Using survey data for 
469 Maryland farmers, Kimhi and Lopez (1997) also find that farm owners’ plans with 
respect to the timing of retirement are systematically related to farm and personal 
characteristics. Older farm operators plan to retire later, as do more educated and wealthier 
farmers. On the basis of the same data set, Kimhi and Lopez (1999) investigate the 
importance of succession considerations for retirement plans of farmers. They conclude that 
retirement and succession considerations in family farms are not separable.  
Focusing on the designation of a successor, Kimhi and Nachlieli (2001) investigate 
the impact of family and farm characteristics on the probability of having declared a 
successor. They use survey data for 127 farm families in Israel and report a significant and 
positive relationship between a farm operator’s age and the probability of declaring a 
successor. Likewise, a higher education of the farm operator increases the likelihood of 
finding a successor within the family.  
Analysing actual farm successions on the basis of census data for Upper Austria, 
Stiglbauer and Weiss (2000) find the probability of farm succession to be significantly 
influenced by farm, as well as personal, characteristics. Their results suggest that an increase 
in farm and family size, as well as a higher degree of on-farm diversification, raises the 
probability of farm succession within the family. Again, a significant life-cycle pattern in the 
farmers’ succession behaviour is reported.  
                                                 
2   Surveys on the different conditions for farm successions in various countries are available in Blanc and 
Perrier-Cornet (1993) as well as Errington (1999).  3
In contrast to the existing literature, the present paper is devoted to analysing the 
different dimensions of intra-family succession simultaneously within the same region. Using 
farm survey data for Upper Austria, we examine whether specific family and farm 
characteristics are related to the three dimensions of succession behaviour: (a) the probability 
of succession; (b) the likelihood of having declared a successor; as well as (c) the timing of 
succession.  Additionally, we go beyond the existing literature by investigating the inter-
relationship between these three aspects of succession. A farm operator’s succession plans, 
for example, might not be independent from his efforts to designate a successor, and vice 
versa. Similarly, the existence of a successor might influence the farm operator’s plans with 
respect to the timing of succession. Section 2 briefly describes the data. Section 3 reports the 
empirical results and section 4 offers conclusions.  
 
2. Data 
Our analysis of inter-generational succession is based on a survey of 1,650 Upper 
Austrian farm households in 1993. Only farm operators aged 45 or above have been 
surveyed. The respondents were asked about their succession plans. In particular, they 
indicated which of the following four alternatives best describes their situation: (a) farm 
succession is certain and a farm successor is already determined; (b) farm succession is likely 
but a successor has not yet been determined; (c) farm succession is rather unlikely but a 
potential farm successor is available; or (d) farm succession is uncertain and no successor is 
available. To analyse farm succession econometrically, statements (a) and (b) are 
summarized as ‘farm succession is certain or likely’ (SUCC = 1) and statements (c) and (d) 
are summarized as ‘farm succession is unlikely or uncertain’ (SUCC = 0). Analogously, to 
examine the probability of having a successor designated we combine statements (a) and (c) 
to ‘farm successor is available or designated’ (DESIG = 1) as well as (b) and (d) to ‘farm 
successor is not available or not designated’ (DESIG = 0). Table 1 shows the classification of 
all 1,650 farms into the four different categories. 
More than 50% of all respondents reported that farm succession is likely or certain 
and a farm successor is available or already has been determined. Only fewer than 10% of the 
respondents consider succession to be unlikely and had no successor available or designated. 
 
  4
Table 1: Expectations on Intra-Family Succession in Upper Austrian Farm Households 
  SUCC = 0  SUCC = 1  Total 
DESIG =  0  141 230 371 
DESIG = 1  354  925  1,279 
Total 495 1,155  1,650 
 
In addition, the respondents were asked about the expected timing of successions, 
measured in years until the proposed transfer of the farm (TIME). Unfortunately, 19% (314) 
of the farm operators surveyed did not respond to this question. The number of observations 
for this variable thus decreases to 1,336.
3  
The data set also includes information on the farm, as well as some family 
characteristics such as age, sex, schooling, and the off-farm employment status.
4 The “Annual 
Standard Gross Margin” (SGM) as well as the number of livestock (LU) is used as a measure 
of the farms’ earnings capacity.
5  The Annual Standard Gross Margin is an imputed measure 
of farm income based on the quantity and types of products produced on the farm, given 
average commodity prices and input costs in the area.  The “livestock units” (LU) is an index 
defined according to the live weight of an animal. A live weight of 500 kg (1,102 pounds) 
corresponds to one livestock unit. Unfortunately, more appropriate management variables 
(e.g., farm profits, household income, and wealth) are not available. Table 2 reports 
descriptive statistics of all variables used in the empirical analysis. 
 
                                                 
3   Chances are that the refusal to answer this question is related to personal and farm characteristics. In 
this case, selection biases in the econometric model on the timing of farm succession might be 
encountered. Although estimation results of a sample-selection tobit model actually report significant 
effects of farm and household characteristics on the probability of responding to this question, a 
significant selection effect can not be observed (see Table A.1. in the appendix). 
4    This information has been obtained by matching the farm survey data to a farm census in Upper 
Austria. We are grateful to Ernst Fürst for preparing and providing this data set. 
5   Upper Austria is one of three major agricultural regions in Austria and is particularly devoted to dairy 
products. While 19% of all farms are located here, those farms own 29% of all livestock in Austria.  5
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In contrast to empirical studies analysing the determinants of family succession on the 
basis of census data (such as Kimhi, 1994 and Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000), farm surveys 
derive an advantage from the fact that detailed and direct information can be obtained on the 
respondents’ subjective evaluation of the succession situation.  A sub-sample of farm 
operators (where DESIG = 1 and SUCC = 0) were asked to specify why they consider farm 
succession to be uncertain (or unlikely). This direct evidence (summarized in Table A.2. in 
the appendix) can serve as a background for interpreting the results of the econometric 
analysis to be reported in the following section. 
 
3. Results 
The results of the econometric analysis are shown in Table 3. Columns [1] and [2] 
report parameter estimates of a bivariate probit model on the probability of family-succession 
as well as the designation of a successor. Column [3] has the results of a tobit model on the 
timing of farm succession. The estimation models are statistically significant at the 1% level 
or better, as measured by the likelihood ratio test. The predictive power of models [1] and [2] 
when it comes to classifying observations into the four categories (SUCC = 0/1 and DESIG = 
0/1) differs between the individual categories. The models in columns [1] and [2] correctly 
classify 69.7% and 72.4% of all observations. Whereas 88.5% (86.5%) of all cases with 
certain succession (with a successor designated) are correctly predicted, the percentage of 
families reporting uncertain succession (no successor designated) being correctly classified is 
substantially lower with 26.1% (23.9%).  8
Table 3: Results of Econometric Models on the Probability of Succession, the 
Designation of a Successor, and the Timing of Succession 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
  Dependent Variable:  SUCC [1] DESIG [2] TIME [3] 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Independent Variable (Symbol)  Param. (t-value)  Param. (t-value)  Param. (t-value) 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Constant  -4.568 (-2.00)  -7.896 (-3.47)  230.372  (6.76) 
Standard Gross Margin (SGM)  /100  0.811 (3.05)  0.394 (1.30)  -0.026  (-0.65) 
Livestock Units (LU)/100  0.681 (2.37)  0.227 (0.75)  -3.602  (-0.07) 
Leased out Land (LEASE)  -0.027 (-1.90)  -0.023 (-1.67)  0.365  (0.10) 
Credit Load (CREDIT)  -0.257 (-2.07)  -0.164 (-1.35)  0.220  (0.88) 
On-Farm Specialisation (HHI) 0.317  (1.45)  -0.055  (-0.24)  1.451  (3.21) 
Part-time Farm (PT) 0.123  (1.43)  -0.047  (-0.50)  0.041  (0.22) 
Age of Farm Operator (AGE)  0.149 (1.83)  0.239 (2.89)  -9.737  (-5.39) 
Age of Farm Operator Squared (AGE
2)/100  -0.139 (-1.94)  -0.192 (-2.62)  13.843  (4.39) 
(Age of Farm Operator)
 3 (AGE
3)/1000        -0.654  (-3.59) 
Farm Operator’s Experience (EXPER)/100  0.881 (1.76)  0.504 (0.89)  -2.256  (-2.56) 
Number of Male Fam. Memb. (FAM-M)  0.276 (7.53)  0.055 (1.06)  -0.238  (-3.08) 
Number of Female Fam. Memb. (FAM-F)  0.040 (0.89)  0.154 (3.12)  -0.283  (-3.21) 
Marriage Status (MARR)  0.288 (2.47)  0.302 (2.08)  0.498 (1.71) 
Gender of Farm Operator (GENDER)  0.197 (1.84)  0.277 (2.11)  -1.085  (-4.52) 
Hardship Zone (HARD)  -0.295  (-2.26) 0.337  (2.28) 0.467  (1.53) 
Regional Dummy Variable 1 (R1) 0.225  (0.65)  -0.501  (-1.44)  1.243  (1.87) 
Regional Dummy Variable 2 (R2)  -0.216  (-1.37) 0.087  (0.54) 0.457  (1.48) 
Regional Dummy Variable 3 (R3)  -0.458  (-1.86) 0.330  (1.19) 1.312  (2.43) 
Regional Dummy Variable 4 (R4)  -0.144  (-0.92) 0.071  (0.46) 0.008  (0.03) 
Regional Dummy Variable 5 (R5)  -0.155  (-0.99) 0.203  (1.26) 0.392  (1.27) 
Regional Dummy Variable 6 (R6)  -0.436  (-2.51) 0.275  (1.48) 0.252  (0.69) 
Regional Dummy Variable 7 (R7)  0.123 (0.74)  0.178 (1.00)  0.679 (2.14) 
Regional Dummy Variable 8 (R8) 0.081  (0.48)  -0.045  (-0.27)  0.639  (1.99) 
Regional Dummy Variable 9 (R9)  -0.318  (-1.58) 0.059  (0.27) 0.348  (0.88) 
Succession Likely (SUCC)     0.868  (2.03)  -0.551  (-1.83) 
Successor Designated (DESIG)        -0.382  (-0.99) 
Disturbance Correlation (ρ ) -0.485  (1.99) 
Sigma (σ )       2.575  (51.53) 
Log-Likelihood -1,698.872  -3,152.054 
Restricted Log-Likelihood  1,880.252  -3,730.555 
Likelihood Ratio Test (DF)  362.760 (47)  1,157.002 (26) 
R
2 McFadden (Veal/Zimmermann)  0.096 (0.246)  0.155 (0.512) 
% Correct predictions  69.76  72.42 
% Correct predictions of “ones” (“zeros”)  88.48 (26.06)  86.47 (23.98) 
Remarks:  The number of observations is 1,650 in models [1] and [2] and 1.336 in model [3]. The 
variables SUCC and DESIG in model [3] have been instrumented. DF are degrees of 
freedom.  9
Comparing the results of columns [1] and [2] suggests that the probability of 
succession is influenced significantly by a number of economic characteristics of the farm, 
whereas the socio-economic attributes of the farm family (e.g., age of farm operator, number 
of family members) strongly influence the likelihood of having a successor appointed.  
According to Table 3, an increase in farm size increases the probability of farm 
succession, the parameter estimates for both the standard gross margin (SGM), and for 
livestock units (LU) are positive, and significantly different from zero in column [1]. For a 
hypothetical farm,
6 a 10% increase in SGM (in LU) raises the probability of succession by 
0.89%-points (0.59%-points). Large farms hold out the best prospects of providing a potential 
successor with a reasonable and secure income. These results are confirmed by 
questionnaires directly evaluating the farm operator’s assessments. A low farm income ranks 
as the single most important reason for farm succession to be uncertain in Upper Austria (see 
Table A.2. in the appendix). Similarly, Gasson et al. (p. 23, 1988) conclude: “one of the main 
reasons for children not taking over the family farm is that the farm is too small”. With 
respect to the probability of having a successor designated, as well as the timing of 
succession, however, the farm size variables did not contribute significantly to the 
explanatory power of the model (see columns [2] and [3] of Table 3). 
The probability of succession, as well as the likelihood of having nominated a 
successor, significantly declines with the amount of land leased out. The absence of a 
successor might reduce the incentives for expanding capacity, and leasing out a large share of 
farm land (LEASE) could then be a reasonable strategy to reduce working hours and make 
life easier. The timing of succession is not significantly related to this variable, however. 
Furthermore, farms strained with a high credit load (CREDIT) are found to have a 
significantly lower probability of succession. Again, the likelihood of having a successor 
appointed, as well as the timing of succession, are not influenced by this variable. 
Empirical studies of Potter and Lobley (1992), as well as Stiglbauer and Weiss 
(2000), suggest a negative relationship between on-farm diversification and the probability of 
farm succession. The results reported in columns [1] and [2] do not support this hypothesis. 
Neither the probability of succession nor the likelihood of having a successor designated is 
significantly related to the Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI). Column [3] of Table 3, 
                                                 
6   A hypothetical farm is characterised by taking mean and mode values of exogenous continuous and 
dummy variables, respectively. The probabilities of succession and declaration of a successor for this 
hypothetical farm are 68.9% and 86.9% respectively.  10
however, suggests that succession is postponed on specialised, as opposed to diversified 
farms. The parameter estimate of HHI is positive and significantly different from zero. 
The issue, whether part-time farming is a stable phenomenon, or constitutes the first 
step on the way to farm exits, is a very controversial one in agricultural economics. Kimhi 
and Bollman (1999) and Kimhi (2000) found that the exit probability decreases with the 
extent of off-farm work in Canada and Israel. On the other hand, Pfeffer (1989) suggests that 
part-time farmers in Germany had lower expectations of continuing the farm in the future. 
Similarly, Weiss (1997 and 1999) and Roe (1995) report positive effects of the existence of 
off-farm work on the probability of exits. Stiglbauer and Weiss (2000) find that the 
probability of family succession decreases, whereas the probability of non-family succession, 
as well as the probability of exit, increases with the amount of off-farm work. When asked 
directly, farm operators frequently refer to the good off-farm income opportunities for the 
potential successor (47%), as well as the high working load associated with additional off-
farm work (39%), as important reasons for farm succession being uncertain (see Table A.2. 
in the appendix).  Yet results of the econometric analysis reported in Table 3 do not reveal a 
significant impact of part-time farming on family succession plans. In none of the three 
equations estimated does PT contribute significantly to the explanatory power of the model. 
These results do not give support to the notion that part-time farming stabilizes overall farm 
income, thereby reducing the likelihood of farm exits in the process of inter-generational 
succession. 
With regard to the socio-economic characteristics of the farm operator and his or her 
family, the age of the farm operator (AGE) turns out to be of particular importance. The 
probability of succession first increases with the farm operator’s age, reaches its maximum at 
53 years of age and then declines again. A similar non-linear pattern can be observed with 
respect to the probability of having designated a successor, the highest probability in this case 
occurs at 62 years of age. A number of studies support this non-linear impact of age on 
succession considerations (Laband and Lentz, 1983; Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000; and Kimhi 
and Nachlieli, 2001). As the age of the farm operator increases, he will be more aware of the 
need to make succession plans, thus the positive age/succession relationship. The negative 
relationship between age and the probability of succession at advanced ages of the farm 
operator might indicate that a farmer who postpones succession will have more difficulties in 
finding a successor within the family since his or her children will have started looking for 
alternative employment in the non-farm economy (Kimhi, 1994).  11
The farm operator’s age also significantly influences the timing of succession (see 
column [3] in Table 3). Here again the relationship is non-linear. To facilitate interpretation 
of timing in establishing a succession, a “time path for farm transfers” is shown in Figure 1 
calculated on the basis of the parameter estimates of column [3] in Table 3.  
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A farm operator who is 45 years of age and reports that he plans to hand over the farm 
in 5 years (10 years) would retire at the age of 50 (55). Given that the farm operators’ 
retirement plans are consistent over time, the time of retirement should come closer by one 
year as the farm operator’s age increases by one year. The two 45° (broken) lines represent 
this relationship. The parameter estimates reported in Table 3 however, imply that the 
retirement plans to be expected as the farm operator’s age increases by one year actually 
deviate from these lines. The timing of succession is delayed as the age of the farm operator 
increases, ceteris paribus. This effect is negligible in cases where the proposed time of the 
farm transfer is near (as a comparison between the two lines for a farm operator planning to 
retire in 5 years indicate). However, in the second example, the deviation between the two 
lines is substantial. Whereas the farm operator originally reported wanting to hand over the 
farm in 10 years, he will revise his plans repeatedly and actually retire at the age of 61 
(instead of 55). These results point to a time-inconsistency in the farm operator’s retirement 
plans. 
Time (in years) 
Planned time of farm transfer (in years) 
Actual transfer plan 
„Time consistent“ transfer plan  12
Given that more experienced farmers (EXPER) will be able to run their farm more 
successfully, we would expect to find the willingness of a successor to take over these farms 
to increase as well. Table 3 supports this argument. For a given age of the farm operator, an 
increase in the farmer’s experience significantly increases the likelihood of succession and 
reduces the time until the farm is handed over. The parameter estimate in column [1] however 
is significantly different from zero at the 10% level only. Differences in the farm operator’s 
experience do not significantly influence the likelihood of having declared a successor (see 
column [2] of Table 3). 
Following previous empirical studies (Pfeffer, 1989; Stiglbauer and Weiss, 2000), we 
find the number of family members living on the farm to significantly influence succession 
considerations. The probability of succession as well as the likelihood of having somebody 
appointed as a successor is significantly higher for farms where the farm operator’s child 
(FAM-M, and FAM-F), as well as his or her partner (MARR), also lives on the farm. For a 
hypothetical farm, the probability of succession increases by 9.01%-points as the number of 
male family members living on the farm increases by one. The likelihood of having a 
successor appointed increases by 3%-points for each additional female family member. With 
regard to the timing of succession, Kimhi (1995) and Kimhi and Nachlieli (2001) expect the 
number of children to delay the succession decision, “as it generates competition among the 
potential successors that hurts their bargaining position. The number of sons is expected to 
have a stronger effect than the number of daughters, due to the concept of sons as preferred 
successors” (Kimhi and Nachlieli, 2001, p. 49). This hypothesis can not be supported for the 
farms surveyed. On the contrary, the number of male or female family members reduces the 
planned time until farm transfer. Succession will be postponed, however, on farms where the 
farm operator’s partner also is working on the farm. For female farm operators (GENDER = 
1) we find the likelihood of succession as well as the probability of having declared a 
successor to be significantly higher. Furthermore, farm successions in these farms take place 
earlier, ceteris paribus. 
Regional differences have been controlled for by using several regional dummy 
variables (R1 to R9 as well as HARD). Farms located in less favoured areas (HARD = 1) report 
a significantly lower probability of succession, which is confirmed by Weiss and Stiglbauer 
(2000). Surprisingly however, these farms report a higher likelihood that a specific successor 
has already been determined (see columns [2] of Table 3).  13
To evaluate the relationship between the two dimensions of farm succession (SUCC 
and DESIG), we carried out a number of estimation experiments along the lines suggested in 
Maddala (1983).
7 According to the results reported in Table 3, the likelihood of having 
declared a successor is significantly higher in farms where succession is certain or likely 
(SUCC = 1). The estimated correlation coefficient (ρ ) measuring the correlation between the 
disturbances of equations [1] and [2] is negative and significantly different from zero at the 
5%-level. In column [3] of Table 3, we observe a significant impact of the probability of 
succession (SUCC) on the timing of succession. Not surprisingly, farms will be transferred 
earlier if farm succession is likely, ceteris paribus. We thus conclude that the different 
dimensions of farm succession analysed here are inter-related. Exclusively focusing on one 
dimension of farm succession and ignoring their inter-relationship only provides an 
incomplete picture of the process of farm succession. 
 
4. Summary 
Farming is dominated by family forms of production, where business ownership and 
management are handed down within the family. Due to a strong reliance of family farming 
on inter-generational succession, the existence or absence of successors can be an indication 
of the long-run prospects of the survival of family farms.
8 This study examines the family and 
farm attributes affecting family succession. On the basis of a farm survey, three aspect of 
succession are analysed: (a) the probability of family succession; (b) the likelihood of having 
a successor designated; and (c) the timing of succession. A bivariate probit model is 
estimated on the first two dimensions of the succession process, a tobit model is estimated on 
the timing of succession.  
                                                 
7    Maddala (1983) discusses alternative simultaneous-equations models with discrete endogenous 
variables. A general specification for a two-equation model would be: 
  y1
* = γ 1y2 + ββββ 1’X1 + ε 1 and y2
* = γ 2y1 + ββββ 2’X2 + ε 2, with E[ε 1] = E[ε 2] = 0, Var[ε 1] = Var[ε 2] = 1 and 
Cov[ε 1, ε 2] = ρ . The unobservable variables y1
* and y2
* are related to the observable variables y1 and y2 
as follows: y1 = 1 if y1
* > 0 and is zero otherwise; y2 = 1 if y2
* > 0 and is zero otherwise. Maddala shows 
that this model is logically consistent if and only if γ 1 or γ 2 is equal to zero. To find the appropriate 
specification for a model with two endogenous variables SUCC ( 1 y ≡ ) and DESIG ( 2 y ≡ ), we first 
estimate three different models. In model (1) we assume γ 1 = γ 2 = 0 and thus no direct relationship to 
exist. Model (2) assumes γ 1 = 0 whereas model (3) has γ 2 = 0. A likelihood ratio test does not reject 
model (1) against model (3). However, model (1) is rejected against model (2). We thus consider model 
(2) the most appropriate specification, the results of this specification are reported in columns [1] and 
[2] in Table 3. 
8   On the basis of linked census data, Weiss (1999) found a highly significant positive effect of succession 
on farm survival.   14
Farm characteristics significantly influence succession considerations to the extent that 
they affect the value of the farm for the potential successor. Larger and highly specialised 
farms are more likely to be transferred and to have appointed a successor. The number of 
family members living on the farm also significantly influences succession plans. The 
probability of succession, as well as the likelihood of having designated a successor, first 
increases with the age of the farm operator and then declines again. Furthermore, the timing 
of succession is delayed as the age of the farm operator increases. This result suggests that 
the farm operators’ plans reported in farm surveys are inconsistent over time. The reported 
succession time will be biased downwards. In addition, we find a significant inter-
relationship between the different aspects of succession indicating that the decisions on 
family succession, the designation of a successor, as well as the timing of succession, are not 
separable. 
There is, however, a problem in distinguishing cause and effect with respect to some 
of the explanatory variables used in the empirical models. A small farm, for example, might 
be less attractive for a potential successor, reducing the likelihood of succession. Yet the 
causation could also be reversed. Sociological studies suggest that farm operators without 
successors lack the incentive and the motivation to expand their enterprise.  Instead they 
would gradually run down their farm in an attempt to reduce working hours and make life 
easier.
9 Again, farm size and the likelihood of farm succession would be positively 
correlated. Differentiating empirically between the two explanations would require analysing 
individual farms over a longer time period (panel data) and is not possible on the basis of 
cross-section survey data. 
An important point is that the farm survey used only considers the farm operator’s point 
of view and does not pay enough attention to the children’s intentions. The extent to which 
the farm operator’s plans materialise, however, might be related to farm and family 
characteristics, thus introducing biases into empirical results from farm surveys. The 
combination of farm surveys with the investigation of actual succession decisions is therefore 
an important area of future work to improve our understanding of family succession and the 
survival of family farms. 
 
                                                 
9   Kimhi, Kislev and Arbel (1995) refer to this as the „shadow of succession effect“.  15
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Appendix: 
Table A.1:  Results of Sample Selection Tobit Model on the Timing of Succession 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
  Dependent Variable:  REPORT TIME 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Independent Variable (Symbol)  Parameter (t-value)  Parameter (t-value) 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
_ 
Constant -7.264  (-3.16)  229.964  (6.97) 
Standard Gross Margin (SGM) /100  0.029  (1.27)  -0.054  (-1.11) 
Livestock Units (LU)/100 0.491  (1.70)  -0.496  (-0.76) 
Leased out Land (LEASE) -0.035  (-2.74)  0.053  (0.94) 
Credit Load (CREDIT) 0.434  (0.311)  0.254  (0.95) 
On-Farm Specialisation (HHI) 0.113  (0.48)  1.308  (2.67) 
Part-time Farm (PT) 0.034  (0.36)  0.019  (0.10) 
Age of Farm Operator (AGE) 0.305  (3.73)  -9.536  (-5.33) 
Age of Farm Operator Squared (AGE
2)/100 -0.286  (-3.97)  13.178  (4.08) 
(Age of Farm Operator)
 3 (AGE
3)/10000     -0.059  (-3.05) 
Farm Operator’s Experience (EXPER)/100 0.493  (1.03)  -2.719  (-2.66) 
Number of Male Fam. Memb. (FAM-M) 0.117  (2.70)  -0.347  (-2.74) 
Number of Female Fam. Memb. (FAM-F) 0.072  (1.44) -0.345  (-3.05) 
Marital Status (MARR) 0.183  (1.53)  0.067  (0.20) 
Gender of Farm Operator (GENDER)  -0.134 (-1.21)  -1.105 (-4.00) 
Hardship Zone (HARD) -0.661  (-5.05)  1.075  (1.45) 
Regional Dummy Variable 1 (R1) 0.301  (0.65)  1.075  (1.45) 
Regional Dummy Variable 2 (R2) -0.553  (-2.81)  0.775  (1.46) 
Regional Dummy Variable 3 (R3) -0.556  (-1.92)  1.778  (2.49) 
Regional Dummy Variable 4 (R4) -0.511  (-2.63)  0.296  (0.58) 
Regional Dummy Variable 5 (R5) -0.458  (-2.32)  0.663  (1.39) 
Regional Dummy Variable 6 (R6) -0.974  (-4.67)  0.973  (1.04) 
Regional Dummy Variable 7 (R7) -0.003  (-0.01)  0.612  (1.79) 
Regional Dummy Variable 8 (R8) -0.378  (-1.85)  0.809  (1.87) 
Regional Dummy Variable 9 (R9) -0.455  (-1.88)  0.634  (1.19) 
Lamda (λ )       -1.924  (-0.79) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Log-Likelihood -716.769  -3,143.974 
Restricted Log-Likelihood  802.992  -3,734.819 
R
2 McFadden (Efron) [Veal/Zimmermann]  0.107 (0.118) [0.192]   
% Correct predictions  82.18 
% Correct predictions of “ones” (“zeros”)  98.57 (12.42) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Remarks: The  variable  REPORT is set equal to one if the farm operator responded to the question 
on the time until the proposed transfer of the farm and is zero otherwise. 
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Table A2: Ranking of Motives for Uncertain Farm Succession 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
Farm succession is uncertain because …  I strongly  I partly  I disagree  I don’t know 
 agree  agree 
  absolute absolute absolute absolute 
  (in %)  (in %)  (in %)  (in %) 
_________________________________________________________________________ 
… the working load on the farm is too high  82 (28)  100 (34)  94 (32)  22 (7) 
… farm income is too low  173 (55)  93 (30)  31 (10)  15 (5) 
… of the bad financial performance of the farm  31 (10)  47 (16)  203 (68)  18 (6) 
… of good income opportunities of successor  140 (47)  62 (21)  47 (16)  51 (17) 
     in the non-farm economy 
… of the double working load in a part-time farm  117 (39)  67 (22)  77 (26)  40 (13) 
      (work on and off the farm) 
… necessary investment are too large  57 (19)  78 (26)  141 (47)  21 (7) 
… uncertain political environment in the farm sector  163 (53)  57 (18)  45 (15)  44 (14) 
… health reasons  9 (3)  17 (6)  237 (80)  35 (12) 
… no partner is available  47 (16)  18 (6)  124 (42)  105 (36) 
… the partner does not want to work in the farming  16 (6)  14 (5)  117 (41)  140 (49) 
     sector 
… lack of interest in the farming sector  33 (11)  80 (27)  134 (45)  48 (16) 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Remarks:  These questions have been addressed to farm operators reporting that a successor has been 
designated but succession is uncertain. 